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NOTE: FLATFORD V. CHATER:
NO ABSOLUTE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO SUBPOENA A
PHYSICIAN PROVIDING POST-HEARING EVIDENCE AT
A SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY HEARING
James L. Hoyle*
I. Introduction
This decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit concerns the discretion to deny a due process entitlement
to a disability claimant seeking a subpoena for a physician providing
post-hearing evidence expands upon its previous decision in Calvin v.
Chater' where the court determined an absolute right did not exist to
a subpoena in order to conduct an oral examination of the claimant's
treating physician at the hearing.2 This line of decisions continues to
conflict with other circuits,3 and the Supreme Court needs to resolve
this issue.
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in Flatford
v. Chater4 affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the case
based upon the magistrate's recommendation, and concluded that the
administrative law judge had not abused his discretion in refusing to
issue a subpoena of a physician. The Sixth Circuit held: (1) the
Commissioner of Social Security can base his decision on the evidence
in the record and is not limited to the evidence obtained in the hearing,
and, (2) the administrative law judge did not abuse his discretion by
*The author is an administrative law judge with the Department of Administrative
Hearings, Office of the Illinois Secretary of State and a student at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law.
173 F.3d 87 (6th Cir. 1996). See, Oppenheim, Note, Calvin v. Chater, 15
J.N.A.A.L.J. 143 (1996).2Id. at 93.
3The Circuits in the following cases have relied upon Richardson v. Perales and
concluded that social security claimants have an absolute right to subpoena persons
providing evidence: Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. Tex. 1990), Coffin v.
Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. Iowa 1990), Townsley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.
N.Y. 1984), Demenech v. Secretary of HHS, 913 F.2d 882,884 (11th Cir. 1990), Wallace v.
Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 193 (3rd Cir. 1988) and Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th
Cir. 1976),93 F.3d 1296 (6th Cir. 1996).
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denying the claimant's request to subpoena and cross-examine a
reporting physician questioned by the judge after the hearing.' This
Note examines this second holding.6
II. Background
Mr. Flatford, who suffered from coronary artery disease, applied
for Social Security disability benefits and supplemental income benefits
on March 7, 19837 Flatford's claim was denied and he reapplied on
October 2, 1987.8 In a decision issued July 24 1989, Flatford was
determined to be disabled as of December 1, 1987.1
On September 1, 1990, the Social Security Administration
reopened Flatford's 1983 application pursuant to his request following
the decision in Samuels v. Heckler. " Prior to reopening the Hearing,
the AU submitted interrogatories to a cardiologist and offered
Flatford's attorney the opportunity to submit his own interrogatories. "
Flatford's attorney did not submit any questions at that time, but he
requested a copy of the responses and reserved the right to cross-
examine the physician after obtaining the responses. "
A hearing was held on May 6, 1991, and the AU submitted as
an exhibit the responses made by the physician. 3 Flatford's attorney
5Flatford 93 F.3d at 1307.
6Id. at 1302, citing Lawson v. Secretary of HUS, 688 F.2d 436 (6th cir. 1982). The
court held that post hearing evidence was permitted under the Secretary's statutory
authority to conduct additional proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) and (b).
7Id. at 1297.
81d.
91d.
10668 F. Supp. 656 (W.D.Tenn. 1986). In Samuels, a class of claimants excluded
from disability and supplemental security income benefits on a basic of an unlawful policy
statement and ruling, were entitled to a redetermination of their cases under new standards
requiring consideration of the degree that their impairment interfered with ability to work.
These claimants received notification by certified mail that they had a right to a
redetermination and the instructions on the procedures to be used.
1 2Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1298.
21d. at 1298.
131d. at 1298. Pursuant to the open file policy of Social Security these should
have been available earlier to the attorney.
XVI Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 312
had not received a copy of the responses prior to the hearing so the ALJ
agreed to submit further interrogatories to the physician subsequent to
the hearing.' 4
Flatford's attorney submitted two requests for a supplemental
hearing to cross-examine the physician. The AU denied the requested
hearings but permitted Flatford to submit additional interrogatories. 5
The AU based his denial upon his interpretation of Social Security
Regulation 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(1) and (d)(2) which provides the
AU with the discretion to issue a subpoena where reasonably necessary
for the full presentation of a case and upon a showing by the claimant
that the specified facts could not be proven without issuing a
subpoena.'6 The AU determined that Flatford's attorney failed to make
a showing as to why the facts regarding Flatford's health could not be
obtained through interrogatories. "
Flatford submitted additional interrogatories on September 17,
1991, however, he again requested cross-examination because the AU
edited and drdeted some of the questions submitted and some answers
were unresponsive."8
The AL did not respond to the renewed request for a subpoena,
but he denied Flatford's claim 9 on December 21, 1991. Flatford
appealed the denial and the Appeals Council remanded the case because
the AU failed to respond to Flatford's renewed request for a
subpoena.2" The Appeals Council instructed the AU to permit
additional interrogatories or to explain why they were not warranted.2'
Flatford submitted additional interrogatories and again renewed his
request for cross-examination. The AU submitted the interrogatories
141d
151d.
'
61d. Flatford's attorney indicated his reasons for needing cross-examination
were that the answers provided by the doctor during direct cross examination would direct
his next question and that he was not furnished with Dr. Saunders' responses until the day
of the May 6 hearing despite his efforts to contact the Office of Health Administration to
see if the responses had been received.
71Id.
19Id. at 1299.201d.
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but instructed the physician to disregard two questions.22
On February 1, 1993, after receiving the physician's latest
response, Flatford once again requested a supplemental hearing and an
opportunity to cross-,:xamine the reporting physician. 23 The ALJ
denied Flatford's request because he believed the renewed request did
not seek material facts which have not already been proved in previous
interrogatories 4
On June 22, 1993, The ALJ once again denied the claim after
finding that Flatford had the capacity to perform sedentary work and
that he was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review on
October 26, 1993, and the decision became final.25
Flatford filed suit in federal court on December 27, 1993. On
February 2, 1995, a magistrate recommended that the Commissioner's
decision be affirmed because of the discretion granted to the ALJ under
20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(1). 26  The district court accepted the
recommendation of the Magistrate and determined the ALJ had not
abused his discretion.27 Flatford appealed.
III. Discussion and Analysis
A. Issue Raised on Appeal
The issue raised on appeal was whether a social security
disability claimant has an absolute right under due process to subpoena
and cross-examine a medical advisor who provides a post-hearing
report.28 Impliedly raised, as well, was the scope of discretion to refuse
issuance of a subpoena.
Flatford argued that the discretion granted to the ALJ pursuant
22 Id.
2 3 1d.
2 41d.
251Id.
26/d The district court's decision is unpublished.
2 71d
.28 d.
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to 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) violated his right to procedural due process,
because there is an absolute right to cross-examination in a social
security hearing. To support his contention Flatford cited Richardson
v. Perales"9 and decisions of six other Circuits of the United States
Court of Appeals.3"
The Commissioner argued that the appellate court should follow
its decision in Calvin v. Chater," where the court determined that an
AL's discretion to issue subpoenas under 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(d)(1) 32
did not violate the procedural due process rights of a claimant of
supplemental security income seeking a, subpoena for a physician who
submitted a prehearing report.3
B. The Appellate Court's Decision on Due Process. 4
I. Due Process Requirements Met When Cross-
Examination Available Where Reasonably
Necessary.
The Sixth Circuit relied on Richardson v. Perales"5 and assumed
that Flatford has a property interest in the benefits he claims. 36
29402 U.S. 389, 410, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1431-32, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
30Supra Note 3.
3173 F.3d 87 (6th Cir. 1996.)32This regulation involves the procedures for obtaining a subpoena by a claimant
seeking supplemental security income and is identical to the procedures for issuing
subpoenas under 20 C.F.R § 404.950(d)(1) to claimants seeking disability benefits. It
states in relevant part: "When reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a case, an
administrative law judge...may, on his or her own initiative or at the request of a party,
issue subpoenas."33Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1301, citing Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92-93.
34Before addressing the due process issue, the appellate court addressed whether
the Commissioner can make a decision based upon the evidence in the record, rather than
only on the evidence "adduced at the hearing"under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). The appellate
court determined the Commissioner's broad interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) was not
arbitrary and capricious because the commissioner was also given broad regulatory
authority and the authority to conduct other hearings and investigation under 42 U.S.C. §
405(a) and (b).35Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420.36Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1305.
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Furthermore, the court agreed with Perales that "due process requires
that a social security hearing be 'full and fair."' 37
The Sixth Circuit considered several factors related to having an
absolute right to subpoena and cross-examine every witness. The
court weighed the burdens an absolute right to subpoena anid cross-
examine would have on the witnesses and the administrative system
against the unlikely danger of inaccurate medical information and
biased opinions that would result in a claimant being wrongly denied
benefits.38 The court reasoned that the nonadversarial nature of social
security adjudications makes the need to cross-examine every reporting
physician unnecessary and that the use of interrogatories provided a
meaningful opportunity to Flatford to present all of his evidence and to
confront any contrary evidence.39 The court concluded that by having
cross-examination available where reasonably necessary to the full
development of ihe case, the due process requirements are met.40
11. Discretion: A Close Call!
While the Sixth Circuit concluded the ALJ had not abused his
discretion by denying the subpoena to Flatford, it noted that its
conclusion was a close call. 4' The court acknowledged that there is a
37 Id., citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 401-02, 9i S.Ct. at 1427. While the Sixth
Circuit agreed with Perales that the hearing must be "full and fair," the Sixth Circuit
believed that Perales failed to provide the complete answer regarding whether the claimant
must have cross-cxamination in order for the hearing to be "full and fair."38Id. at 1306.391d
411Id at 1307.
41The Sixth Circuit made its conclusion despite contrary case law. William
Allen, Flatford's attorney, provided various examples of cases concluding that an ALJ
abused his discretion by denying a subpoena. Those cases are: Cowart v. Schweiker, 662
F.2d 731 (1! th Cir. 1981 )(ALJ's decision based upon post-hearing reports invalidated
where claimant not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine.), Demenech v. Sec. of the
Dept. of Health and Human Services, 913 F.2d 882 (11 th Cir. 1990)(cross-examination is
of extraordinary utility where the ALJ substantially relies upon post-hearing medical
report.), Solis v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1983)(to show bias, interrogatories are
an inadequate substitute for cross-examination.) Souch v. Califano, 599 F.2d 577 (4th Cir,
1979)(denial of request for subpoena for reporting physicians violates due process when
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danger that the claimant may not have the opportunity to cross-examine
a physician when the AU obtains post-hearing evidence." The court
considered three factors that may prevent the claimant from having the
opportunity to ross-examrine. The first factor was whether the claimant
may be discouraged from seeking a supplemental hearing because of
the additional expense, inconvenience and delayed decision.43
Secondly, the court considered the number of questions not answered
by the physician combined with the interrogatories that were withheld
by the AL." The final factor was whether the AU abandoned his role
as an impartial decision maker or failed to aid the claimant in the full
development of the record. 5
Upon considering these factors, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
Flatford's attorney was very successful in gathering information from
the physician with the interrogatories and that more precisely drafted
interrogatories may have solved the problem.46 Finally, the court
concluded that the record did not reflect that the AU had abandoned
his role as an impwstial decision maker or failed in his duty to aid the
ALJ substantially relies on those physicians' reports.). Telephone interview with William
Allen, Rural Legal Services of Tennessee. (November 6, 1996.) (hereafter "Allen
Interview").
431d. It should be noted the claimant was being represented by William Allen,
Rural Legal Services of Tennessee.
44d. The majority of the questions originally excluded by the AL were
subsecuently sent to the physician. Some of these questions related to the instructions
provided by Social Security to the physician explaining how to answer the interrogatories.
Furthermore, the issue remains regarding the non-responsive answers by the physician to
interrogatories. For exaniple, the physician responded initially that he had reviewed the
whole record. However, when responding to subsequent questions relating to reports on
claimants with similar symptomatology, he indicated he could not answer these questions
because the reports were not in the record, when in fact they were. Cross-examination may
have proved very helpful under such circumstances to discre lit the physician or
demonstrate bias. Indeed, the substance of the unanswered questions should have been
given more consideration by the Sixth Circuit rather than the number left unanswered.
Allen Interview, supra note 41.45Id,
4 6Id. at 1307. While the court noted that more precisely drafted interrogatories
may have solved the problem, Mr. Allen advises that an opportunity to provide additional
interrogatories has not been provided. Allen Interview, supra note 41.
316
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claimant in the full deveiopment of the record.47
IV. Conclusion
While the conclusion made by the Sixth Circuit is the minority
opinion, it is a sound sohttion co this issue and a logical extensioc, to
the decision rendered by the Sixth Circuit in Calvin v. Chater As
decided in Flatford v. Chater, there is no absolute right to subpoena a
physician providing post-hearing evidence, whereas in Calvin there is
no absolute right to subpoena in order to conduct an oral examination
of the treating physician at the hearing Both decisions affirm an AL's
discretion under similar regulations to issue subpoenas when it is
reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a case.
However, as noted by the Sixth Circuit in the instant case, it was
a close call whether the ALJ abused his discretion in the case at bar.
While the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that an ALJ has the discretion to
issue subpoenas where reasonable, its conclusion regarding abuse of
discretion in the instant case is far less supportable.. An opportunity
t j cross-examine the reporting physician should have been granted
considering the significance of the interrogatories left unanswered and
because the reporting physician's credibility was seriously at issue.
Indeed, the most serious credibility problem for an expert winess who
gives an opinion regarding a set of documents, concerns that expert's
farniliarity with important information in the documents. Since the
piysician demonstrated a lack of knowledge of contents of the file,
cross examination to determine the impact, or not, of the overlooked
data on his conclusions appears critical. Anything less appears a denial
of due process.
Many questions remain, aot only because there exists a split
among the circuits, but also because it remains unclear how much
discretion an ALJ should be allowed. The Supreme Court should
affirm the AL's discretion to issue subpoenas where reasonably
necessary, however, while considering this close call on discretion, it
XVI Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 318
should establish the standards for the AL's discretion, particularly
when guidance exists to impeach the reliability of expert medical
opinion.
